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In the United States, national public preparedness efforts meant to ready individ-uals and families for disasters have been driven primarily by international threats,
actual or anticipated. These include terrorism, war and the potential for global insta-
bility such as the millennium Y2K computer error. The national dialogue on public
preparedness following Hurricanes Katrina and Rita in the fall of 2005 is a notable
departure from the more typical focus of public preparedness, which is oriented
toward terrorism and international threats. However, the response to the hurricanes
was largely viewed as an unanticipated test of the public’s readiness for a disaster
and the penetration of the public preparedness messages that have been actively
promulgated since 11 September 2001. As such, we argue that the poor state of pub-
lic readiness that was found in the U.S. Gulf Coast region after the hurricanes actu-
ally reflects a national state of unpreparedness for emergency events despite the post-
September 11th calls from all levels of government for the U.S. public to be prepared.1
Since 11 September 2001, a renewed national focus on the U.S. public’s readi-
ness for international aggression emerged. This focus was heightened by the anthrax
mailings shortly after September 11th  and the alleged threat of an Iraqi attack using
unconventional weapons, specifically smallpox, on the U.S. homeland. The post-
September 11th  focus on national public preparedness came almost two years after
calls had ended for the public to prepare for the millennium Y2K computer error and
its potential to disrupt everything from alarm clocks to the power supply. Prior to
the millennium, the national public had engaged in a preparedness dialogue born
during the Second World War amid calls for the public to engage in air raid and
naval watches that continued throughout the Cold War and its threat of nuclear
attacks. The post-September 11th national public preparedness dialogue reignited a
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theme in government-public communications that has existed since the years lead-
ing up to the Second World War: government calls for the public to prepare for
doomsday scenarios arising from an international threat. 
It is important to distinguish between nationally led calls to prepare centered on
international threats versus regional preparedness endeavors based on local natural
or emergency weather events, such as earthquake drills in California or tornado shel-
ter constructions in the Midwest. Taken as a whole, the period of 1940 to the pres-
ent represents what can be viewed as a federal government-public preparedness dia-
logue born out of national security. This is unique from natural disaster prepared-
ness efforts, which are typically led by state and local governments. Such efforts lack
the heightened importance of a national call framed around an international threat
in which the American way of life is perceived to be at
stake if the nation—including the public—is insufficient-
ly prepared. During this nearly continuous sixty-five year
period—with a notable gap from the early 1980s, through
the collapse of the Soviet Union, until the mid-1990s
prior to the focus on the millennium Y2K threat—the dia-
logue has been led by federal agencies—some now defunct, like the Department of
War—the succession of White House administrations, and a host of non-govern-
mental organizations, most notably the American Red Cross. We find that regardless
of the administration or context of the threat, the U.S. public has regarded itself as
unprepared when called on by the federal government to take measures in response
to or in anticipation of international threats. In other words, the failure of the U.S.
public to be prepared for terrorism in 2005 bears little difference to the state of pub-
lic preparedness during other periods in which national calls were issued. The same
holds true, as it turns out, for public preparedness with respect to natural disasters. 
We present data from our 2005 annual national survey, and the follow-up sur-
vey after Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, of the U.S. public’s views on terrorism, pre-
paredness and other topics germane to emergency events. Our first surveys took
place in the months after September 11th, and we continued conducting them once
every summer beginning in 2003. Findings from the 2005 surveys present a U.S.
public confused about what “prepared” means, an unchanging and even declining
engagement of the preparedness message and mixed perceptions as to who is in
charge in various disaster scenarios. We compare the findings from these surveys
with other national surveys conducted between 1940 and 2000, when, by and large,
public preparedness became a national focus because of international threats. These
key points for this comparison include the period prior to and during the Second
World War, the height of the Cold War including the Cuban Missile Crisis and the
millennium Y2K preparations. We consider the public preparedness data in the con-
text of how the message is framed and the level of public belief that an attack will
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actually happen and will affect them. We suggest several factors that may determine
the likelihood of the public to embrace a national preparedness message and con-
clude with a perspective on the importance of public preparedness.  
ME T H O D S
The National Center for Disaster Preparedness (NCDP) at Columbia
University’s Mailman School of Public Health annually conducts a nationwide sur-
vey of households in the United States. The surveys began in the immediate after-
math of 11 September 2001, with the first polls completed three and six months after
and then annually each August beginning in 2003. The surveys are administered in
the field by the Marist College Institute for Public Opinion in July and August, with
the exception of the 2005 follow-up to the 2005 annual survey, which was adminis-
tered in the field in October. Both of the 2005 surveys as well as prior years’ surveys
employ the same methodology: they have an approximate sample size of 1,200, a
margin of error of roughly +3.0 and are at a 95 percent confidence interval. Each sur-
vey includes trended questions, as well as “one-off” questions appropriate to the given
time period. Trended questions include confidence in the government and the health
care system, willingness and ability to evacuate, personal and family preparedness
plans, personal sacrifice, community preparedness, perceptions and engagement of
all-hazard preparedness and other questions thematic to emergency preparedness and
response. All questions are cross-tabulated with a variety of demographics including
race, age, gender, income, region, size of community, political affiliation and educa-
tion. Surveys are conducted in both English and Spanish.2
Telephone numbers are selected based upon a complete list of telephone
exchanges from throughout the nation. The exchanges are selected to ensure that
each census division is represented in proportion to its population. A national ran-
dom digit dial (RDD) equal probability selection method (EPSEM) is used to draw
the telephone numbers. This sampling design gives every telephone number within
active telephone blocks in the contiguous forty-eight states and the District of
Columbia an equal chance of being selected. The final sample is compared with data
based on the 2000 U.S. Census to ensure the sample is representative in terms of
geographic distribution, gender and race. To correct for any discrepancies between
the final sample and the population estimates, the dataset is weighted in aggregate
by census division and then balanced by 2000 U.S. Census population estimates for
gender and race of adults eighteen years of age or older. The sample size is preserved
throughout the weighting process. 
The surveys observed from 1940 to 2000 are primarily from the Gallup
Organization. Gallup polling arguably represents the most comprehensive, longest
running and most methodologically sound surveys of the U.S. public. The Gallup
questions on public preparedness during the Second World War and in the early
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years of the Cold War are unique in that they were the only questions of their type
asked in national, trended public polls. As such, the questions are invaluable data
points for understanding the U.S. public’s engagement with the federal govern-
ment’s public preparedness agenda. While other organizations, notably the National
Public Opinion Research Center (NORC) at the University of Chicago, have also
administered surveys asking questions on public preparedness, the Gallup surveys
incorporated public preparedness as a thematic category, giving a broader range of
questions across more years than any other organization.
THE ST A T E OF THE U.S.  P U B L I C ’S RE A D I N E S S :  2001-2005
If one regards preparedness as the public’s readiness for an international threat,
then the U.S. public is not prepared. This has been established in public polls and
corroborated, if not confirmed, by the events of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.3 The
hurricanes, which were the first major test of the U.S. public’s ability to respond to
a disaster since a renewed focus on homeland security emerged after September
11th, revealed a regional population largely unprepared for a disaster, natural or oth-
erwise. Our research shows that the failure of the public to prepare along the Gulf
Coast is, in fact, a national problem. The region’s failures to stock provisions or evac-
uate effectively, as well as its poor levels of awareness about community disaster
plans, are found throughout the United States with little variation across region or
size of community. In a sense, the hurricanes were an unanticipated test of the
nation’s preparedness for terrorist threats.
The central preparedness message from the federal government in the aftermath
of September 11th and the run-up to the war in Iraq was for individuals and fami-
lies to prepare for biological, chemical and radiological attacks and scenarios in
which critical infrastructure, such as food supply systems and key transportation
routes, could be disrupted.4 The preparedness messages have ranged from stocking
practical supplies such as food, water and extra medications and forming family
plans including meeting points and emergency phone numbers, to purchasing duct
tape to seal windows in order to create a “safe room” in the event of a biological or
chemical attack, to asking the public to go about their everyday routines. 
In essence, the federal government’s central message was to prepare for low prob-
ability, high consequence events. However, by the second anniversary of September
11th, there was low public attention to terrorism preparedness. While people believed
terrorism was likely to occur in the United States in the near future, they also believed
it was unlikely to affect them personally.5 This belief, coupled with the need to make
preparedness practical for more frequent events such as regional weather emergencies,
led to a refining of the national message toward “all-hazards preparedness.” 
All-hazards preparedness emphasizes that effective disaster planning allows indi-
viduals and families to literally be ready for “all hazards,” from low probability
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events like terrorism to cyclical and periodic events like natural disasters and pro-
longed power failures.6 From a political standpoint, especially in the aftermath of
Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, the shift from framing preparedness strictly as a prac-
ticality for terrorist events to all hazards was necessary. With the failure to find
weapons of mass destruction in Iraq and the absence of further domestic terror
attacks, holding public attention to prepare for terrorism was eroding.7 All-hazards
preparedness has been most prominently
championed by the Department of
Homeland Security (DHS), its predecessor
and current sub-agency, the Federal
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA),
Citizen Corps, also a division of DHS, and
the American Red Cross (ARC). The all-hazards preparedness message is not new
and in fact has been the mantra of FEMA since its inception during the Carter
administration, yet it arguably had not received a sustained national platform until
DHS and ARC began incorporating it as part of public terrorism readiness agendas
post-September 11th. 
Through DHS’s Ready.Gov initiative for disaster preparedness, FEMA and
Citizen Corps programs, the institution of a “National Preparedness Month”
(September), campaigns by ARC and the America Prepared Campaign, U.S. public
readiness was expected to increase. Each of these efforts was accompanied by a Web
page with lists of emergency provisions that each family should stock and guides on
how to form an emergency plan. Press releases were issued to highlight the avail-
ability of the materials and to direct the public to the Web sites while ads were taken
out on buses in major cities. The America Prepared Campaign placed a three-page
spread in the Sunday New York Times providing a checklist of materials and actions
for families to undertake.8 In addition to national engagement efforts, state and local
efforts—largely funded by DHS—echoed the national messages and also included
the development of Web sites and media campaigns.9
Yet our research shows that the public is not prepared. Equally concerning, evi-
dence suggests that the all-hazards approach has failed to gain traction with the pub-
lic. Though Hurricanes Katrina and Rita were natural disasters, the prevalence of the
all-hazards approach to public preparedness would allow one to conclude that the
region’s lack of readiness for a natural disaster would also mean that same popula-
tion is even less likely to be prepared for a terrorist attack. Our data suggests that
nationally, those prepared for a terrorist event are actually fewer than those who con-
sider themselves as prepared for a natural disaster or emergency weather event. This
calls into question the effectiveness of the all-hazards message as a means for engag-
ing the public to prepare for an international threat. 
It is worth considering what being prepared actually means for the public at




failed to gain traction
with the public.
5_redlener.qxp  3/12/2006  8:37 AM  Page 91
large. While the notion of “prepared” has been subject to debate, basic benchmarks
for individual and family preparedness can be broadly broken into three essential
categories:10
1. Possession of resources such as food, water, medications, radio and
other staples useful under evacuation or sheltering conditions; 
2. Formation of family plans such as meeting points, phone numbers and
other pre-established decisions when faced with uncertain reunification
and contact; and 
3. Knowledge of local and regional plans such evacuation routes, shelter
locations and other variables under government mandate.
Our surveys indicate that the public is deficient in all of these criteria.11
In the aftermath of Hurricanes Katrina and Rita, when asked if in general they
felt personally prepared for a natural disaster or emergency weather event in their
community, just over half (53 percent) of survey respondents described themselves
as prepared. When asked about a terrorist attack in their community, only a third
(35 percent) felt personally prepared. However, there is an important discrepancy
between “self-identification as prepared” and having actually taken steps that trans-
late into “actually being prepared.” Less than half (43 percent) reported having a
family emergency preparedness plan that all members of the family knew about. Of
those who reported having a plan, less than a third (31 percent) reported having all
the major elements that are part of an emergency plan (i.e., two days food and water,
a flashlight, a portable radio and spare batteries, emergency phone numbers and a
meeting place). When we consider knowledge of local and regional plans, including
evacuation plans, we find an uninformed public. Only a third (34 percent) reported
being familiar with emergency or evacuation plans in their community in the event
of a natural disaster or emergency event. When asked about a terrorist attack, less
than a quarter (22 percent) reported being familiar with emergency or evacuation
plans in their community. It is worth noting that having a family emergency pre-
paredness strategy, yet lacking knowledge of community evacuation plans, is likely
to diminish the effectiveness of even the best family plan. All of the above respons-
es were unchanged or only slightly changed from just prior to Hurricane Katrina,
suggesting that these events along with government and media messages on public
preparedness have done little to stimulate individual and family readiness. 
Despite the national dialogue on the topic that has emerged since Hurricanes
Katrina and Rita, there has also been little change in the public’s views on evacua-
tion in the event of a terror attack. As found before Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and
unchanged after, in the event of a terror attack, over half (56 percent) of respondents
said they would not obey orders to evacuate their home or office to go to a distant
location if terrorist attacks occurred, either because they would not leave or because
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they would wait until concerns for children and loved ones were addressed. Over a
quarter (29 percent) said they could not leave without help and nearly a third (30
percent) said they could not leave because they did not have transportation. Over a
third (36 percent) said they would not leave if they lacked confidence in who
ordered them to evacuate. While socioeconomic variables, notably access to trans-
portation, may explain public disregard for evacuation, one cannot ignore the pub-
lic’s failure to make the appropriate contingency arrangements in the event of an
evacuation, or to be aware of community evacuation plans, provided they exist.12
Lack of confidence in government officials further highlights the perplexity of
why the public does not prepare for emergencies. According to the study, less than
half of the U.S. public (49 percent) had confidence in the government to protect the
area in which they live from a terrorist attack. This figure has steadily decreased,
from 53 percent in 2004 and 64 percent in 2003. The U.S. public’s expressed con-
fidence in the government’s ability to protect public transportation is also decreas-
ing—only 37 percent reported themselves confident, down from 43 percent in 2004.
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Table 1: Personal and Family Preparedness and Awareness of Community Plans
Pre- and Post-Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
Do you personally feel very prepared, prepared,
not very prepared, or not prepared at all for a
natural disaster or emergency weather event in
your community?
Do you personally feel very prepared, prepared,
not very prepared, or not prepared at all for a
terror attack in your community?
Do you have a family emergency plan that all
family members know about?
Does your family emergency preparedness plan
include all, some, or none of the following; at
least two days food and water, a flashlight, a
portable radio and spare batteries, emergency
phone numbers and a meeting place for family
members in case of evacuation?
In the event of a natural disaster or community
event in your area, are you very familiar, famil-
iar, not very familiar or not familiar at all with
the emergency of evacuation plan in your com-
munity?
In the event of a terrorist event in your area,
are you very familiar, familiar, not very familiar
or not familiar at all with the emergency of
evacuation plan in your community?
53%             
Very Prepared or
Prepared





34%             
Very Familiar or
Familiar
22%             
Very Familiar or
Familiar
59%         
Very Prepared
or Prepared





37%         
Very Familiar
or Familiar
23%         
Very Familiar
or Familiar
QUESTION OCTOBER 2005 JULY 2005
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Beyond the government, public confidence in the health care system’s ability to
respond effectively to a biological, chemical or nuclear attack is at 39 percent,
unchanged from 2004 and down from 46 percent in 2003 and 53 percent in 2002. 
These low levels of confidence are accompanied by confusion as to who is
responsible for preparedness. Thirty-eight percent believed the federal government
is most responsible for ensuring that communities are prepared for a terrorist attack,
while nearly another third (31 percent) and a fifth (20 percent) believed the local
and state government, respectively, are mainly responsible. However, when asked
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Table 2: Evacuation Pre- and Post Hurricanes Katrina and Rita
QUESTION OCTOBER 2005 JULY 2005
In the event of a terror attack, if you were
ordered to evacuate your home or office and go
to a distant location, would you leave immedi-
ately, wait until concerns about children or
loved ones were addressed, or would you not
leave?
In the event of a terror attack, if you were
ordered to evacuate, thinking about your own
circumstances, would any of the following keep
you from leaving immediately: Not leave
because you are unable to leave without help.
In the event of a terror attack, if you were
ordered to evacuate, thinking about your own
circumstances, would any of the following keep
you from leaving immediately: Not leave
because of your lack of confidence in who is
ordering you to leave.
In the event of a terror attack, if you were
ordered to evacuate, thinking about your own
circumstances, would any of the following keep
you from leaving immediately: Not leave




29%             
Yes
36%             
Yes











Table 3: Who is Responsible for Community Preparedness?
QUESTION OCTOBER 2005
Who is most responsible for ensuring communities
are prepared for a terrorist attack?
Who is most responsible for ensuring communities
are prepared for a natural disaster of emergency
weather event?
38% Federal    
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about natural disaster or emergency weather events, the responses are completely
reversed. Nearly half (45 percent) believed local governments are most responsible
for ensuring communities are prepared while nearly a quarter (23 percent) indicat-
ed state governments and less than a fifth (17 percent) indicated the federal gov-
ernment. With respect to what the highest national priority should be, the country
is nearly evenly split between preparing for future acts of terror (36 percent) and
preparing for an outbreak of disease and other medical crisis (35 percent). About a
fifth (22 percent) said preparing for natural disasters and emergency weather events
is the highest priority. 
Should a stronger public engagement have been expected after September 11th?
If we observe past periods of federal government-public preparedness dialogues
when framed by international threats, it appears that the public disengagement that
followed September 11th is actually the norm. However, there are few historical
points that offer a suitable basis of comparison with which to gauge the relative level
of the present public response. Perhaps the most salient analogy is the surprise attack
on Pearl Harbor on 7 December 1941, the United States’ subsequent entry into the
Second World War, and the subsequent Cold War culture of imminent threat. Like
Pearl Harbor and the events that followed, the attacks of September 11th were an
unexpected international aggression that sparked the United States’ entry into actu-
al war (Iraq and Afghanistan) as well as a war of ideals (the War on Terror) in which
the homeland was deemed to be under threat. As was the case during the Second
World War and the Cold War, the federal government has called on the U.S. public
to prepare themselves and their communities for a disaster brought by foreign
attack. The millennium Y2K preparations, which came less than a decade after the
Cold War ended, carried on the federal calls for public preparedness. While not driv-
en by the threat of war or terrorism, these preparations bear many similarities to the
calls to prepare for international threats such as September 11th and Pearl Harbor,
with public preparedness framed as necessary to mitigate widespread infrastructure
collapse, the potential for mass hysteria and the loss of government functions.
Moreover, given the millennium’s proximity to 11 September 2001, it offers an adja-
cent period of comparison to the present. 
THE CO N T E X T OF U.S.  P U B L I C PR E P A R E D N E S S :  1940-2000
In the face of international threats, the U.S. public has consistently reported
itself as unprepared. This has been demonstrated despite perceived threats, attacks
on the homeland and pronouncements from federal officials and agencies as to
potentially imminent warfare or terrorist actions. From 1941 with the bombing of
Pearl Harbor through the nuclear arms race and Cold War, to the present war on ter-
rorism, the U.S. public has remained generally disinterested in the notion of per-
sonal disaster preparedness. 
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On 10 December 1941, just after Pearl Harbor and at the onset of U.S. engage-
ment in the Second World War, when asked if they knew where to go in the event
of an air raid, only a third (35 percent) gave a correct answer with nearly six out of
ten (58 percent) saying they had given the question no thought.13 Further, when
asked if, outside of regular employment, the respondent was doing any work in civil
defense programs such as air raid watches or first aid, just 9 percent said they were,
while another 9 percent said they were not, but had signed up for something. Civil
defense programs served as the primary means by which communities were sup-
posed to protect themselves from further Pearl
Harbor-type attacks on the homeland.14 Despite
aggressive campaigns for the public to join civil
defense programs, by February of 1942, almost three
months after Pearl Harbor and the entry of the
United States into the war, just under a quarter (23
percent) of respondents participated in a civilian defense program, with another 10
percent saying they had not, but had signed up for one.15 Two years later, in 1943,
when asked if they had had to make any “real sacrifice” for the war effort, only 2
percent said they had volunteered as air wardens, in civilian defense, or with the
ARC.16 In other words, civil defense was not seen as a priority in the culture of
national sacrifice that prevailed in civic life during the years of the Second World War. 
It is worth acknowledging the difference between personal preparedness and
national sacrifice, which are generally viewed as distinct. During the Second World
War, the U.S. public cooperated with the federal government in unprecedented and
since unreplicated ways. The public mostly accepted and supported the military
draft, limitations on gasoline and food consumption and purchased bonds to help
finance the war effort, actions that are all viewed as personal sacrifice toward a
national effort. When asked in 1943—at about the midpoint of the war—whether
the government had gone too far or not far enough in asking people to make sacri-
fices for the war, only 8 percent answered “too far” with 44 percent saying “not far
enough.”17 Further, only 11 percent did not own war bonds or stamps and nearly
three-quarters (73 percent) had either canned or grown at least some of their own
vegetables. Yet personal and community preparedness remained insufficient
throughout the Second World War, with civil defense and personal and family pre-
paredness never reaching the levels of engagement and acceptance of rationing or the
military or war industries drafts. 
This trend of public unpreparedness continued into the Cold War. In 1953, par-
ticipation in civil defense programs had fallen to 4 and 1/2 percent with only 3 per-
cent saying they had not participated, but had signed up.18 When informed that
civil defense officials said it would cost about $200 to build a “reasonably safe air
raid shelter,” just 2 percent said they were likely to build one in the next year. A year
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later in 1954, when asked about a hypothetical war with the Soviet Union and sub-
sequent air raid alert in their town, just 6 1/2 percent of the public said they would
follow instructions of civil defense wardens, with 4 percent saying they would report
to civil defense duty.19 Nearly a fifth (19 percent) said they did not know what they
would do or they would do nothing.
In 1960, with the nuclear arms race intensifying, only 11 percent of the public
had done anything to prepare for a nuclear attack.20 While nearly three-fourths (71
percent) favored a law requiring every community to build a public bomb shelter,
less than a fifth (21 percent) had ever given thought to building a home bomb shel-
ter. Further, when hypothetically asked if they would
pay $500 for a home bomb shelter, almost two-thirds
(61 percent) said they would not have one built for
themselves and their family. A year later in 1961, only
2 percent of the public said they had made any
changes to their home to protect against a nuclear
weapons attack.21 A month after asking the above question, Gallup asked it again
with an emphasis on whether respondents planned to prepare their home for an
attack. Despite tax breaks for home shelter construction and broad public awareness
campaigns, just 12 percent said yes and 1 percent said they already had.22
By the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, just 4 percent of the U.S. public respond-
ed affirmatively when asked broadly if they had engaged in safety or survival relat-
ed activities.23 While the threat from Cuba and the tensions that followed domi-
nated the U.S. public’s concerns during and after the crisis—the event has been
described as the closest the United States has come to a nuclear war—public pre-
paredness did not improve. In 1963 despite a quarter (24 percent) of the public
describing the danger of world war as the second most important problem facing the
country (communism in the United States was first with 31 percent), only 2 percent
said fallout shelters were the most important priority, with 41 percent—the highest
of any choice—selecting it as the least important.24 This was the case even with low
levels of home shelter construction and awareness of public shelter location. 
In the 1970s, despite U.S. combat operations in Vietnam, continued tension
with the Soviet Union and ongoing federal government calls for the U.S. public to
prepare for nuclear war, readiness did not improve. In 1976, when asked again about
a proposed law that would require every newly built home in the United States to
have a bomb shelter, with the federal government carrying the bulk of the costs, over
half (55 percent) of respondents opposed the plan with 7 percent having no opin-
ion.25 The law’s unpopularity was apparently not tied to a greater awareness of pub-
lic bomb shelters. When asked, only a quarter (26 percent) knew where the nearest
shelter was. Two years later, in 1978, that figure remained virtually unchanged (24
percent) and by 1981 it had dropped to 20 percent.26 In 1981, support for the pro-
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posed law to require bomb shelter construction in all new homes, with most costs
covered by federal monies, remained unchanged.27 The law was never passed. 
In the early 1980s, the disconnect in the federal government-public prepared-
ness dialogue around public readiness for a nuclear attack was reduced to the con-
cept of crisis relocation. In essence, the government assumed all planning for sus-
taining the public in the event of a nuclear attack, with the acceptance that most of
the population would not survive. The plan was gen-
erally mocked in the media and within policymaking
circles and gained little traction with the public in
terms of both awareness and support.28 When the
Cold War ended in late 1980s and the threat of
nuclear warfare subsided, the federal government
essentially stopped discussing public preparedness as a national endeavor. This was,
for lack of any official declaration, apparently the result of a more stabilized inter-
national community and the absence of international terrorism as a, publicly dis-
cussed, domestic concern. 
By the late 1990s, the millennium Y2K computer error emerged as the next
calamity for which to prepare. As told, the error would result when computers—
quite literally, any computer from a pacemaker to a mainframe overseeing a power
grid—that were programmed to read the year as a two-digit field would malfunction
as a result of the date rolling from “99” (short for “1999”) to “00,” which could be
interpreted by the computer as 1900. The practice of abbreviating the year was so
widespread that prognosticators, including media and government officials, warned
the repercussions of a massive malfunction could be cataclysmic. Beyond fears of
major computer malfunction, concern for terrorism was also high. In December
1998, 61 percent of the public felt a terrorist attack was likely—a figure unchanged
one year later just prior to Millennium New Year’s Eve.29
In response to the Y2K threat, President Clinton signed legislation to prepare
the nation’s computer systems across critical industries (banking, power, etc.),
FEMA developed citizen preparedness guides and the media extolled the public to
prepare. Once again, despite declarations by the Clinton administration that this
was a “global challenge,” and despite the potential for massive disruptions to every-
day life, the public did not respond to the call to prepare.30 With respect to terror-
ism, security was increased in both the run-up to the millennium and on the evening
itself. Notably in the months before the millennium, the United States arrested
members of an Islamic extremist group with plans to destroy the Seattle Space
Needle on New Year’s Eve. 
Even with the threat of global instability from the computer error and the
known threat of terrorism, the public remained disengaged. In March 1999, when
asked about a variety of actions they would or would not probably do to protect
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themselves against problems associated with the Y2K bug, the public remained gen-
erally disinterested.31 This included stockpiling food and water (60 percent said no),
buying a generator or wood stove (75 percent said no) and withdrawing or setting
aside a large amount of cash (70 percent said no). By August 1999, the numbers had
stayed virtually the same or declined: 63 percent would not stockpile food or water,
85 percent would not buy a generator or wood stove and 74 percent would not with-
draw or set aside cash.32 When asked generally if they had done anything to prepare
for the millennium, over half (55 percent) said they had not. 
UN D E R S T A N D I N G THE PR E P A R E D N E S S DI S C O N N E C T
Why the U.S. public has not engaged in personal preparedness when called on
by the government to gird for international threats is perplexing. Other nations,
notably Israel, have shown that high levels of public uptake are possible when the
government calls for preparedness.33 The U.S. public has in the past been receptive
to federal government requests as seen during the Second World War with high lev-
els of national sacrifice and, though hotly debated, the general acceptance of the mil-
itary draft during the Vietnam War. So, what is it about personal and family pre-
paredness in the face of war, terrorism and international destabilization that disen-
gages the public no matter how much the federal government extols its virtues and
provides incentives? 
Of particular interest is the public attitude with respect to personal sacrifice ver-
sus preparedness. This phenomenon is not really well understood. Reasonable spec-
ulation might suggest that personal sacrifice, such as joining the military, has higher
social value, reflecting positive actions or bravery during an actual crisis. Stockpiling
canned foods and battery-operated radios may be perceived as significantly more
passive, reflecting anxiety rather than bold action. Further study in this area would
be helpful in understanding the factors that have historically constrained efforts to
encourage public preparedness
While there are many possible reasons for poor public uptake, including how the
message is constructed (notably, the current all-hazards strategy) and confidence in
the government, another critical issue might be the degree to which citizens sense
that an attack will actually affect them or their community. We found that while more
than three-quarters (78 percent) of respondents were concerned that there will be
more terror attacks in the United States, less than a third (31 percent) believed an
attack would happen within a year. Likewise in New York City, which was actually
attacked by international terrorists twice within the last thirteen years, more than
three-quarters (76 percent) of New Yorkers were concerned that there will be more
terror attacks, but less than a quarter (23 percent) believed an attack would happen
within a year.34 Thus, we see a population with a belief in future acts of terror, but a
failure to see that threat as immediate. Gallup polling asked similar questions that
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provided consistent results. In a December 2005 survey, only 11 percent of respon-
dents were very worried that they or someone in their family would be a victim of ter-
rorism.35 This figure was virtually unchanged from a survey exactly one year earlier
(13 percent) and only slightly lower than immediately after 11 September 2001 (18
percent). Prior to September 11th, and as far back as 1995, concern never exceeded
14 percent (1995) and dropped to as low as 4 percent (2000). 
These trends extend back to the Cold War and the Second World War. In 1941,
immediately after Pearl Harbor, only a third (33 percent) believed there was “any
chance” their city would be bombed.36 Shifting the context from the intimacy of self-
location to the broader issue of widespread war, at the onset of the Cold War, the
public was asked about fears of a third world war. From 1951 to 1955, and fairly
consistently, only about a fifth of the population believed a third world war would
happen in the year following when the question was asked.37 The notable exception
was 1951 at 26 percent. Given the national prominence of nuclear tensions with the
Soviet Union and combat operations in Korea, the number of people believing that
a third world war was likely was relatively low. 
Regarding public preparedness, if belief in the homeland threat is low, it is rea-
sonable to understand the public’s disinterest in government calls to prepare. A
notable example of this detachment from international threat and the associated
state of unpreparedness was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Not only was the U.S. public
unprepared for a nuclear attack, but despite anecdotal reports of high stress and ten-
sions, a study by NORC found only a third (36 percent) reported that the week of
the Cuban Missile Crisis was “different than most weeks” and of those that said it
was, only 11 percent said Cuba was the difference.38 Such was the case just prior to
the millennium. In December, just weeks before the New Year, while a third (35 per-
cent) believed the Y2K computer error would cause major problems in general, only
14 percent believed it would cause major problems for them personally.39 On New
Year’s Eve, only 7 percent believed it was very likely a major problem would result
from the Y2K error. Accordingly, only 11 percent said they would take special pre-
cautions that evening.40
CO N C L U S I O N
In an age where the perception of societal threat, be it from international ter-
rorism, rogue nuclear states, industrial calamities or major natural disasters is pre-
sumably high, the U.S. public seems perhaps aware or anxious, but clearly unmoti-
vated to pursue actions that are thought to enhance personal emergency readiness.
While this striking disconnect between awareness and personal response may be dif-
ficult to understand, a comprehensive review of public preparedness surveys reveals
little change in readiness behavior since 1940. In effect, during the past 65 years of
U.S. history, through world war, imminent threat of nuclear annihilation, global sys-
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tem breakdown, international terrorism on U.S. soil and the reality of catastrophic
weather events, nothing seems to spur more than a relatively small minority of citi-
zens to take basic actions to improve their chances of surviving a major disaster.
Addressing the barriers to improving public preparedness is important. It is
increasingly understood that citizen participation in disaster planning and response
is an essential factor in determining actual readiness for major catastrophic events.
In fact, optimal preparedness is best understood as a partnership between govern-
ment strategies and individual behaviors. The failures of “both partners” were
painfully evident in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina. Government response was
late, disorganized and frequently ineffective. Citizens in the affected region often
fended well for themselves, but many could have done so much more effectively with
basic planning well in advance of this particularly devastating storm. Still to be
examined is the mass evacuation attempted following Hurricane Katrina and the
behavioral consequences of extreme poverty and chronically reduced access to pub-
lic services. Clearly, these could be significant determining factors in the successful
evacuation of an indigent population. Late evacuation, general confusion, loss of
personal documents and medical records and separation of children from parents are
among the problems that may have been less prevalent had more families engaged
in disaster planning in the months or year prior to the gathering clouds of one of the
biggest storms in modern U.S. history. The entire experience represents a critical
opportunity to learn a great deal about preparing for disasters, no matter what the
context, and human behavior during acute crises. If we fail to appreciate the lessons
of Katrina and the patterns of disengagement observed during the Second World
War and the Cold War, prior to Y2K, and after September 11th, we likely face the
same kinds of consequences during future threats, natural or otherwise.
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